In many communication channels, secrecy constraints usually incur a penalty in capacity, as well as generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF). In this work we show an interesting observation that, adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in sum GDoF, for a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel. For the interference channel where each transmitter sends a message to an intended receiver without secrecy constraints, the sum GDoF is a well-known "W" curve, characterized by Etkin-Tse-Wang in 2008. If the secrecy constraints are imposed on this interference channel, where the message of each transmitter must be secure from the unintended receiver (eavesdropper), then a GDoF penalty is incurred and the secure sum GDoF is reduced to a modified "W" curve, derived by Chen recently. In this work we show that, by adding a helper into this interference channel with secrecy constraints, the secure sum GDoF turns out to be a "W" curve, which is the same as the sum GDoF of the setting without secrecy constraints. The proposed scheme is based on the cooperative jamming and a careful signal design such that the jamming signal of the helper is aligned at a specific direction and power level with the information signals of the transmitters, which allows to totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints. Furthermore, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to the rational independence are used in the secure rate analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Shannon's seminal work in 1949 [1] , information-theoretic secrecy has been studied for many years in many communication channels, such as wiretap channels [2] - [4] , broadcast channels [5] - [8] , multiple access channels and interference channels [5] , [9] - [31] . In the pioneer work by Wyner in 1975 [2] , the notion of secure capacity was introduced via a wiretap channel with secrecy constraint. For this wiretap channel, Wyner showed that there is a penalty in capacity due to the secrecy constraint. Later on, it has been shown that this insight also holds true for the other channels (see, e.g., [5] , [14] , [15] , [19] , [21] , [24] - [26] , [30] ).
This work focuses on the secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF, a capacity approximation) of a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel, and shows an interesting observation that the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints can be totally removed by adding a helper. For the symmetric Gaussian interference channel without secrecy constraints, the sum GDoF is characterized as a well-known "W" curve (cf. [32] ). If the secrecy constraints are imposed on this interference channel, where the message of each transmitter must be secure from the unintended receiver (eavesdropper), the work in [31] showed that the secure sum GDoF is then reduced to a modified "W" curve (see Fig. 1 ). It reveals that there is a penalty in GDoF in a large regime due to the secrecy constraints. Interestingly, this work shows that adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints (see Fig. 1 ). In other words, by adding a helper, the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel derived in this work is exactly the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without secrecy constraints.
The proposed scheme is based on cooperative jamming and signal alignment. Specifically, the helper sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific direction and power level to confuse the eavesdroppers, while keeping legitimate receivers' abilities to decode their desired messages. The role of helper(s) in secure communications has been studied extensively in the literature (see [5] , [9] , [21] , [24] , [33] and references therein). The helper can be the node transmitting its own confidential message (cf. [5] , [9] , Jinyuan Chen and Fan Li are with Louisiana Tech University, Department of Electrical Engineering, Ruston, LA 71272, USA (emails: jinyuan@latech.edu, fli005@latech.edu). Secure GDoF of interference channel with a helper Secure GDoF of interference channel without any helper [Chen18] GDoF of inteference channel [Etkin, Tse, Wang08] Fig. 1. Secure sum GDoF vs. α for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper, where α corresponds to the interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale). Note that the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel with a helper, derived in this work (cf. Theorem 1), is the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without secrecy constraints (cf. [32] ). Without any helper, there is a penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints (cf. [31] ). [21] , [24] ), as well as the node without transmitting any message (cf. [21] , [33] ). The helper considered in our setting refers to the latter case, which is able to totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints. For the proposed scheme, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to rational independence (cf. [34] ) are used in the secure rate analysis.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model. Section III presents the main result of this work. Section IV describes the proposed scheme via an example. The achievability proof is given in Sections V-VIII and the appendices, while the converse proof is given in Section IX. Section X concludes this work. Throughout this work, I(•), H(•) and h(•) denote the mutual information, entropy and differential entropy, respectively. Z, Z + and R denote the sets of integers, positive integers and real numbers, respectively. o(•) comes from the standard Landau notation, where f (x) = o(g(x)) implies that lim x→∞ f (x)/g(x) = 0. Logarithms are in base 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL In this setting, we consider a two-user Gaussian interference channel with a helper and confidential messages (see Fig. 2 ). The output of the channel at receiver k at time t is
t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where x (t) is the normalized channel input at transmitter under the power constraint E|x (t)| 2 ≤ 1; z k (t) ∼ N (0, 1) is the additive white Gaussian noise at receiver k; m k is a nonnegative integer; and h k ∈ (1, 2] is a normalized channel coefficient, for k = 1, 2 and = 1, 2, 3. In our setting, transmitter 3 is the helper. By following the convention in [31] , we let P max k {2 2m kk }, and define
Then, we can rewrite the channel model in (1) as
where α k ≥ 0 denotes the channel strength of the link between transmitter and receiver k. In the rest of this work, we will consider the channel model in (3) . It is assumed that all the channel parameters {α k , h k } k, are available at each node. For the symmetric case, it is assumed that In this interference channel, a confidential message w k is sent from transmitter k to receiver k, where w k is uniformly chosen from a set
is used to map the message w k ∈ W k to a transmitted codeword
n , where w k ∈ W k denotes the randomness in this mapping, and w k is available at transmitter k only. At transmitter 3 (the helper), the following function
, where the random variable w 3 ∈ W 3 is available at transmitter 3 only. We assume that the random variables {w 1 , w 1 , w 2 , w 2 , w 3 } are mutually independent. A secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if for any > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its own message reliably and the messages are kept secret such that
The secure capacity region, denoted by C, is the closure of the set of all achievable (R 1 , R 2 ) secure rate pairs. We define the secure sum capacity as:
We also define the secure sum GDoF as
Note that the GDoF is a form of capacity approximation. It is more general than degrees-of-freedom (DoF), as the latter considers only a specific case with α k = 1, ∀k, .
III. MAIN RESULT This section provides the main result of this work, for the secure communication over a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper. Theorem 1. Considering the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper defined in Section II, for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 , the optimal secure sum GDoF is characterized as Fig. 3 . Rate (GDoF) and power description at receivers 1 and 2 when α = 3/4.
In this setting defined in Section II, Theorem 1 reveals that adding a helper can totally remove the secrecy constraints, in the sense that the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel with a helper and with secrecy constraints is the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without any helper and without secrecy constraints (a "W" curve, see [32] and Fig. 1 ). The optimal secure sum GDoF is achieved by a cooperative jamming scheme. The achievability is described in Section V. The converse proof is provided in Section IX. Before providing the achievability, we describe the proposed scheme via an example in the following section.
IV. SCHEME EXAMPLE
In this section, we will describe the outline of the proposed scheme via an example. We will focus on the specific case with α = 3/4, for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints and with a helper defined in Section II. Note that, for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel without any secrecy constraints, the sum GDoF is 5/4 when α = 3/4 (cf. [32] ). If the secrecy constraints are imposed on this interference channel, where the message of each transmitter must be secure from the unintended receiver, the secure sum GDoF is reduced to 1 when α = 3/4 (cf. [31] ). Therefore, there is a penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints. Interestingly, we will shows that adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints, that is, by adding a helper the secure sum GDoF is increased to 5/4, which is exactly the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without secrecy constraints. For the proposed scheme, pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and signal alignment will be used in the signal design, and the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation will be used in the rate analysis. The scheme is motivated by the cooperative jamming scheme proposed in [31] for a different setting, i.e., a two-user interference channel with confidential messages but without any helper.
For this case with α = 3/4, the transmitted signals are designed as (removing the time index):
where v k,c and v k,p are two signals that carry the message of transmitter k, for k = 1, 2, and u 3 is the jamming signal from transmitter 3. The random variables {v 1,c , v 1,p , v 2,c , v 2,p , u 3 } are mutually independent. Specifically, for Ω(ξ, Q) {ξ ·a : a ∈ Z ∩[−Q, Q]} denoting the PAM constellation set, the above random variables are independently and uniformly drawn from their PAM constellation sets, given as
respectively, for k = 1, 2, where > 0 can be made arbitrarily small, and γ is a finite constant such that γ ∈ 0,
. Based on our signal design, v k,c carries 3/8 GDoF and v k,p carries 1/4 GDoF, that is, 
At receiver 1, the information signal v 2,c of transmitter 2 is aligned with the jamming signal u 3 of the helper. At receiver 2, the information signal v 1,c of transmitter 1 is aligned with the jamming signal u 3 of the helper. As we will see later on, the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraint will be minimized with this signal alignment design. Fig. 3 describes the rate (GDoF) and power of some signals at receivers 1 and 2 when α = 3/4. As we will discuss in detail in the next section, the secure rate pair
is achievable by the proposed scheme with a careful codebook design and message mapping. Let us begin with the secure rate R 1 expressed in (16 
where (18) 
In Sections V and VIII we will prove that v 1,c and v 1,p designed in (11)-(13) can be estimated from y 1 by using the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation, and the corresponding estimation error probability is
for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 . The proof outline of (22) will be provided later on in this section. By incorporating (21) and (22) into (20) , it gives
for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 . On the other hand, I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) can be bounded as
The detailed proof is provided in the next section. This term I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) can be considered as a penalty term in the secure rate R 1 . The result in (24) reveals that this penalty is sufficiently small, based on our careful signal design. In the proposed scheme, the jamming signal of the helper is aligned at a specific direction and power level with the information signals of the transmitters, which minimizes the rate penalty due to the secrecy constraints. Finally, with the results in (23) and (24), the secure rate R 1 is lower bounded by
and similarly, the secure rate R 2 is lower bounded by R 2 ≥ 5/8 2 log P +o(log P ), for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 . Then the secure GDoF pair
can be achieved by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme for almost all the channel coefficients in this case with α = 3/4.
In the following we provide the proof outline of (22) . After some manipulations, y 1 in (14) can be rewritten as
where
. One important step is to estimate x s from y 1 by treating other signals as noise. This step is called as noise removal. After correctly decoding x s , we can recover q 0 and q 1 from x s because g 0 and g 1 are rationally independent. This step is called as signal separation (cf. [34] ). As we will show in Section VIII, the average power of the virtual noisez 1 is bounded by
for a finite constant κ. To estimate x s from y 1 , we show in Section VIII that the minimum distance of x s , denoted by d min , is bounded by
for all the channel coefficients
2×3 is an outage set and the Lebesgue measure of this outage set, denoted by L(H out ), satisfies
for some constants δ ∈ (0, 1] and > 0. The proofs of (25) and (26) build on the conclusion of Lemma 1 (see below). The results of (25) and (26) reveal that, the minimum distance of x s is sufficiently large for almost all the channel coefficients in the regime of large P , that is L(H out ) → 0 as P → ∞. At this point we can decode the sum x s = √ P 1/4 g 0 q 0 + g 1 q 1 from y 1 by treating other signals as noise (noise removal), with vanishing error probability. After that we can recover q 0 = Qmax 2γ
· v 1,c , as well as v 1,c , from x s because g 0 and g 1 are rationally independent (rational independence). By removing the decoded x s from y 1 , v 1,p can be estimated with vanishing error probability, resulting in
for almost all the channel coefficients in the regime of large P . The lemma used in the proofs of (25) and (26) is given as follows. (27) and set
Then the Lebesgue measure of B, denoted by L(B), is bounded by
Proof. See Section VI.
V. ACHIEVABILITY In this section, for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II, we provide a cooperative jamming scheme, focusing on the regime of α > 1/2. Note that when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the optimal secure sum GDoF d sum = 2(1 − α) is achievable by a scheme without any helper and without cooperative jamming (cf. [31] ). In the proposed scheme, pulse amplitude modulation and signal alignment will be used. In what follows, we describe the details of codebook generation and signal mapping, PAM constellation and signal alignment, and secure rate analysis.
1) Codebook generation and signal mapping: At transmitter k, k = 1, 2, it generates a codebook given as
where v n k are the codewords. All the elements of the codewords are independent and identically generated according to a distribution that will be defined later on. In (29) , w k is the confusion message that is used to guarantee the security of the confidential message w k . R k and R k are the rates of w k and w k , respectively, which will be defined later on (see (40) and (41)). To transmit the message w k , transmitter k selects a sub-codebook B k (w k ) that is defined as
and then randomly selects a codeword v n k from B k (w k ) according to a uniform distribution. In this scheme, the chosen codeword v n k will be mapped to the channel input such that
for , k = 1, 2, = k, and t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where v k (t) is the tth element of the codeword v n k . 2) PAM constellation and signal alignment: Specifically, each element of the codeword at transmitter k, k = 1, 2, is designed to take the following form
which implies that the channel input in (30) can be rewritten as
(removing the time index for simplicity) for , k = 1, 2, = k. At the helper (transmitter 3), it sends a cooperative jamming signal designed as
In (32) and (33), v k,c , v k,p and u 3 are independent random variables which are uniformly drawn from their PAM constellation sets
respectively, for k = 1, 2, and γ v k,c , γ v k,p and γ u 3 are some finite constants designed as 
for different cases of α in the proposed scheme. Based on our signal design (see (32)- (37)), it can be checked that the power constraint E|x k | 2 ≤ 1 is satisfied for k = 1, 2, 3. For example, since v 1,c and v 1,p are uniformly drawn
and
) respectively, we have
which implies that
where h k ∈ (1, 2], ∀ , k and γ ∈ 0,
. Similarly, one can check that E|x 2 | 2 ≤ 1 and E|x 3 | 2 ≤ 1. Based on the above signal design, the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 take the following forms (without the time index)
Based on our signal design, at receiver 1 the signal v 2,c is aligned with the jamming signal u 3 , while at receiver 2 the signal v 1,c is aligned with the jamming signal u 3 . 
3) Secure rate analysis: We define the rates R k and R k as
for some > 0, , k = 1, 2, = k. Given the above codebook design and signal mapping, the result of [24, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) implies that the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) defined in (40) and (41) is achievable and messages w 1 and w 2 are secure, i.e., I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n and I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) ≤ n . In what follows we will focus on the regime of α > 1/2 and analyze the secure rate performance of the cooperative jamming scheme. We will consider four cases:
≤ α ≤ 1, 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 and 2 ≤ α. We will first consider the cases of
and 2 ≤ α, in which a successive decoding method will be used in the rate analysis. Later on we will consider the rest two cases, in which the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to rational independence will be used in the rate analysis.
A. Rate analysis when 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3
For the case with 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, the parameters are designed as
where > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signal at transmitter k, k = 1, 2, 3, is
Then the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 are given by Fig. 4 . Rate (GDoF) and power description at receiver 1 when α = 2/3. Fig. 4 depicts the rate (GDoF) and power of some signals at receiver 1 when α = 2/3. For the proposed cooperative jamming scheme, the secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) defined in (40) and (41) can be achieved. For → 0, this secure rate pair can be written as
First, we focus on the lower bound of R 1 expressed in (50) and seek to get a tight lower bound on I(v 1 ; y 1 ). For this case, v 1 is designed as
(see (31) , (42) and (43)). From y 1 expressed in (48), we can estimate {v 1,c , v 1,p } by using a successive decoding method, given the design in (34)- (36) and (42)- (47). From the steps in (18)- (20), I(v 1 ; y 1 ) can be lower bounded by
Given that
), the rates of v 1,c and v 1,p are computed as follows:
In this case, {v 1,p , v 1,c } can be reconstructed from v 1 , and vice versa. This fact, together with (53) and (54), gives
To further derive the lower bound on I(v 1 ; y 1 ) from (52), we provide an upper bound on the error probability Pr[{v 1,c =v 1,c } ∪ {v 1,p =v 1,p }], described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. When 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (42)-(47), the error probability of estimating
Proof. See Section VII.
By combining (52), (55) and Lemma 2, I(v 1 ; y 1 ) can be lower bounded as Let us now focus on the term I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) in (50), which can be upper bounded by
≤ log(4 · P 2α−1− 2
where (59) follows from the fact that v 1 , v 2 , u 3 are mutually independent; (60) stems from that {v k,p , v k,c } can be reconstructed from v k for k = 1, 2; (61) holds true because H(u 3 ) = log(2 · P 2α−1− 2 + 1) and
log(2πe × 65). Finally, by incorporating (57) and (63) into (50), we can bound the secure rate R 1 as
Let → 0, then the secure GDoF d 1 = α is achievable. Due to the symmetry, d 2 = α is also achievable by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme when 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3.
B. Rate analysis when α ≥ 2
For the case with α ≥ 2, the parameters are designed as
In this case, the transmitted signals are designed as
Then the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 become Figure 5 depicts the rate and power of some signals at receiver 1 when α = 2.
From (40) 
From y k expressed in (68) and (69), we can estimate v k,c by using a successive decoding method, for k = 1, 2. Lemma 3 provides a result on the error probability for this estimation.
Lemma 3. When α ≥ 2, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (64)-(67), the error probability of estimating v k,c from y k , k = 1, 2, is
Proof. See Appendix A.
Considering the lower bound on the secure rate R 1 , I(v 1 ; y 1 ) can be lower bounded by
by following the steps in (18)- (20) . In this case with
2 ), the rate of v 1 is given by
By combining (72) and Lemma 3, the lower bound of I(v 1 ; y 1 ) is given as
By following the steps (58)-(63), I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) can be bounded by
Finally, with the results in (73) and (74), we can bound the secure rate R 1 as
Let → 0, then the secure GDoF d 1 = 1 is achievable. Due to the symmetry, d 2 = 1 is also achievable by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme when α ≥ 2.
C. Rate analysis when 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1 The rate analysis for this case is different from that for the previous two cases. In the previous two cases, a successive decoding method is used in the rate analysis. In this case, we will use the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to rational independence that will be discussed later on.
For this case with 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1, the parameters are designed as
where > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signals are designed as
Then the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 take the same forms as in (48) and (49). Fig. 3 describes the rate and power of some signals at receivers 1 and 2 when α = 3/4. In this proposed scheme, the secure rates R 1 = I(v 1 ; y 1 ) − I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) and R 2 = I(v 2 ; y 2 ) − I(v 2 ; y 1 |v 1 ) are achievable (see (40) and (41)). Let us bound the secure rate R 1 first. By following the steps in (18)- (20), I(v 1 ; y 1 ) can be lower bounded by
For this case, the rates of v 1,c , v 1,p and
To further derive the lower bound on I(v 1 ; y 1 ) from (81), we provide an upper bound on the error probability Pr[{v 1,c =v 1,c } ∪ {v 1,p =v 1,p }], described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. When 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (75)-(80), then for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 , the error probability of estimating
Proof. In this proof we use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The full details are described in Section VIII.
By combining (81), (84) and Lemma 4, I(v 1 ; y 1 ) can be lower bounded by
for almost all channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 . By following the steps in (58)-(60), I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) can be bounded as
Finally, with the results in (86) and (87), the secure rate R 1 is lower bounded by
which implies the following secure GDoF d 1 = 1 − α/2, as well as d 2 = 1 − α/2 due to the symmetry, for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 , in this case with 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1. D. Rate analysis when 1 ≤ α ≤ 2
The rate analysis for this case also uses the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. For this case, the parameters are designed as
Then the received signals at the receivers take the forms as in (68) and (69). In the following we will bound the secure rates expressed in (40) and (41). For this case, v k is designed as v k = v k,c , k = 1, 2. We can estimate v k,c from y k by using the approaches of noise removal and signal separation, k = 1, 2. Lemma 5 presents a result on the error probability for this estimation. 2×3 , the error probability of estimating v k,c from y k , k = 1, 2, is
Proof. In this proof we use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The full details are described in Appendix B.
In the following we will show that by using Lemma 5, the secure GDoF pair (d 1 = α/2, d 2 = α/2) can be achieved for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme. In this case with
) and v 1 = v 1,c , the rate of v 1 is computed as
and then, I(v 1 ; y 1 ) can be bounded by
for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 , where (94) follows from the steps in (18)- (20); and (95) results from (93) and Lemma 5. By following the steps related to (74), I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) can be bounded as Fig. 7 . The illustration of the set B(q0, q1) ∈ (1, τ ] 2 for the case of (q0 = 0, q1 = 0). In this case, there is one strip with slope −A0q0/(A1q1) and width 2β/(A1|q1|).
The final step is to incorporate (95) and (96) into (40). It then gives the lower bound on R 1
which implies the following secure GDoF d 1 = α/2, as well as d 2 = α/2 due to the symmetry, for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 , in this case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 2.
VI. PROOF OF LEMMA 1 In this section, we will prove Lemma 1. Let β ∈ (0, 1], τ ∈ Z + and τ > 1, A 0 , A 1 , Q 0 and
and set
For (q 0 , q 1 ) ∈ {(q 0 , q 1 ) : (q 0 , q 1 ) = 0, q 0 , q 1 ∈ Z, |q 0 | ≤ Q 0 , |q 1 | ≤ Q 1 }, we will consider the following three cases: (q 0 = 0, q 1 = 0), (q 0 = 0, q 1 = 0), and (q 0 = 0, q 1 = 0).
Let us consider the case with (q 0 = 0, q 1 = 0) first. In this case, assuming that A 0 |q 0 | ≥ τ A 1 |q 1 | + 1, then it gives
which contradicts the event |A 0 g 0 q 0 + A 1 g 1 q 1 | < β defined in B(q 0 , q 1 ). Therefore, without loss of generality we will consider
for the case with (q 0 = 0, q 1 = 0). For the first case with (q 0 = 0, q 1 = 0) , as shown in Fig. 7 , the set B(q 0 , q 1 ) has one strip with slope −A 0 q 0 /(A 1 q 1 ) and width 2β/ (A 1 |q 1 |) . The area of this set is upper bounded by
For the second case with (q 0 = 0, 
where (103) results from (101) and (102). Note that
With this, we can bound the term in (103) as
where (105) follows from (100) and (104). Therefore, (103) can be further upper bounded by
Due to symmetry, by interchanging the roles of A 0 and A 1 , and interchanging the roles of Q 0 and Q 1 , L(B) can also be upper bounded by
By combining the results in (107) and (108), we finally bound L(B) as
VII. PROOF OF LEMMA 2 This section provides the proof of Lemma 2. In this proof we will use [31, Lemma 1] described below.
Lemma 6. [31, Lemma 1] Consider the channel model y = √ P α 1 hx + √ P α 2 g + z, where x ∈ Ω(ξ, Q) is the random variable, z ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), and g ∈ S g is a discrete random variable such that |g| ≤ g max , ∀g ∈ S g for a given set S g ⊂ R. In the above model g max , σ and h are positive and finite constants independent of P , and α 1 and α 2 are two positive parameters such that α 1 − α 2 > 0. By setting Q and ξ such that
where γ > 0 is a finite constant independent of P , then the probability of error for decoding a symbol x from y is Pr(e) → 0 as P → ∞.
We will provide the proof of Lemma 2 by focusing on the case with k = 1, as the case with k = 2 can be proved in a similar way. In this proof, we estimate v 1,c , v 2,c + u 3 and v 1,p from y 1 expressed in (48) by using a successive decoding method. At first,
) will be estimated by treating the other signals as noise. Let us rewrite y 1 in (48) as
For this case with 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, it is true that |g| ≤ 4 √ 2 for any realizations of g. At this point, by using the result of Lemma 6 it implies that the probability of error for estimating v 1,c from y 1 is
The decoded v 1,c can be removed from y 1 , which can allow us to estimate v 2,c + u 3 from the following observation
It is true that |g | ≤ 2 √ 2 for any realizations of g . Defineŝ vu as the estimate of s vu v 2,c + u 3 . From the result of Lemma 6, it reveals that
which, together with (112), gives
Similarly, by removing the decoded v 2,c + u
) can be estimated with vanishing error probability, i.e.,
By combining (112) and (116), it gives that the probability of error for estimating {v 1,c , v 1,p } from y 1 is Pr[{v 1,c =v 1,c } ∪ {v 1,p =v 1,p }] → 0 as P → ∞ which completes the proof for the case of k = 1. Due to the symmetry, the case of k = 2 can be proved in a similar way.
VIII. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in this section. In this proof, v 1,c , v 2,c + u 3 and v 1,p will be estimated from y 1 (see (48)) by using the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. At first, the following two symbols
will be estimated simultaneously from y 1 by treating the other signals as noise. Let us rewrite y 1 in (48) as
for a given constant γ ∈ 0,
(see (37)). In this setting, q 0 , q 1 ∈ Z, |q 0 | ≤ Q max , |q 1 | ≤ 2Q max , and √ P 1−α ∈ Z + , based on our definitions P max k {2 2m kk } and √ P α k = 2 m k , k, = 1, 2. Letq 0 andq 1 be the estimates of q 0 and q 1 , respectively, from the observation y 1 expressed in (117). Specifically, we use an estimator that minimizes
We now consider the minimum distance
between the signals generated by (q 0 , q 1 ) and (q 0 , q 1 ). Later on, Lemma 7 (see below) shows that the minimum distance d min is sufficiently large for almost all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 when P is large, with the signal design in (34)-(36) and (75)-(80). Let us now provide Lemma 7, the proof of which is based on the result of Lemma 1 (see Section IV). 
for all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 \ H out , where
2×3 is an outage set and the Lebesgue measure of the outage set, denoted by L(H out ), satisfies
Proof. Consider the case of α ∈ [2/3, 1]. Let us set β δP
for some > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Recall that g 0 h 11 h 23 h 12 , g 1 h 12 h 21 h 13 . Let τ 8. Define the event
We now bound the Lebesgue measure of B by using the result of Lemma 1 (see Section IV), given as
From our definition, the set B is the collection of (g 0 , g 1 ), where
For any (g 0 , g 1 ) ∈ B, there exists at least one pair (q 0 , q 1 ) ∈ {q 0 , q 1 :
. Thus, we can consider the set B as an outage set. For any pair (g 0 , g 1 ) that is outside the outage set B, we have the following conclusion: 
where (123) 
Then, we complete the proof of Lemma 7.
The result of Lemma 7 reveals that, the minimum distance d min is sufficiently large for all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 except for a bounded set H out ⊆ (1, 2] 2×3 whose Lebesgue measure satisfies
In the following, we will consider the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 that are not in the outage set H out . With this channel condition, the minimum distance d min is bounded by
Let us now go back to the expression of y 1 in (117), which can also be described as
In the first step we will decode the sum x s = √ P 1−α g 0 q 0 + g 1 q 1 from y 1 by treating other signals as noise. This step is called as noise removal. After correctly decoding x s , we can recover q 0 and q 1 from x s because g 0 and g 1 are rationally independent. This step is called as signal separation (cf. [34] ). Given that the minimum distance for x s is d min defined in (118), Lemma 7 reveals that this minimum distance is bounded by d min ≥ δP
when the channels are not in the outage set, that is, {h k } / ∈ H out . Definex s as the estimate for x s from y 1 by choosing the point close to x s . Then, the error probability for decoding x s from y 1 in (127) is
where the Q-function is defined as Q(a)
. By using the identity that Q(a) ≤ 1 2 exp(−a 2 /2), ∀a ≥ 0, and together with (129), we can have the following bound
when γδP 2 − √ 2 ≥ 0. Therefore, when P → ∞, it implies that γδP 2 − √ 2 ≥ 0, which then gives the following conclusion on the error probability for decoding x s from y 1
After decoding x s = √ P 1−α g 0 q 0 + g 1 q 1 correctly from y 1 , we can recover the symbols q 0 and q 1 because g 0 and g 1 are rationally independent.
In the second step, the decoded x s can be removed from y 1 and then v 1,p can be decoded from
, the result of Lemma 6 reveals that the error probability for decoding v 1,p is
At this point, it holds true that the error probability of estimating {v 1,c , v 1,p } from y 1 is
Due to the symmetry, the case of k = 2 can be proved in a similar way.
IX. CONVERSE
In this section, we provide the converse proof of the secure sum GDoF in Theorem 1, focusing on the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper defined in Section II. The converse proof is based on the following two steps:
1) The secure capacity region of the interference channel with a helper and with secrecy constraints, denoted by C, is outer bounded by the capacity region of the interference channel with a helper but without secrecy constraints (denoted by C h,ns ), i.e., C ⊆ C h,ns due to the fact that secrecy constraints will not enlarge the capacity region.
2) The capacity region of the interference channel with a helper is outer bounded by the capacity region of the interference channel without a helper (denoted by C nh,ns ), i.e., C h,ns ⊆ C nh,ns because the helper's signal that is independent of the other transmitters' signals, will not enlarge the capacity region for this setting without secrecy constraints.
Therefore, it implies that C ⊆ C nh,ns .
In other words, the capacity region C nh,ns (and the GDoF region respectively) of the interference channel without a helper and without secrecy constraints (see [32] ), will sever as the outer bound of the secure capacity region C (and the secure GDoF region respectively) of the interference channel with a helper and with secrecy constraints.
X. CONCLUSION
For the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel, this work revealed an interesting observation that adding a helper can totally remove the secrecy constraints, in terms of GDoF performance. In the proposed scheme, the cooperative jamming and a careful signal design are used such that the jamming signal of the helper is aligned at a specific direction and power level with the information signals of the transmitters. It turns out that, the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints can be totally removed. In the rate analysis, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to the rational independence are used. In the future work, we will extend the result to the other communication channels with a helper.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In this section we will provide the proof of Lemma 3. We first focus on the proof for the first user (k = 1). In the following, v 2,c + u 3 and v 1,c can be estimated from y 1 by using a successive decoding method with vanishing error probability, where y 1 is expressed in (68). At first,
2 ) can be estimated from y 1 by treating the other signals as noise, where y 1 in (68) can be described as 
which completes the proof for the case of k = 1. Similarly, the case of k = 2 can be proved due to the symmetry.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 5 In this section we will provide the proof of Lemma 5, which is similar to that of Lemma 4. In this case with α ∈ [1, 2], the two symbols
will be estimated from y 1 by using the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The expression of y 1 is given in (68), which can be rewritten as 
where γ ∈ 0, 
A lower bound on the minimum distanced min is given in the following lemma. 
for all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 \H out , whereH out ⊆ (1, 2] 2×3 is an outage set and the the Lebesgue measure of the this outage set, denoted by L(H out ), satisfies
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of the Lemma 7. Considering the case of α ∈ [1, 2], let us setβ δP 
By using Lemma 1, we bound the Lebesgue measure ofB as L(B) ≤ 8(τ − 1)β min{ 8Q
2 max
We can consider setB as an outage set. For any pair (ḡ 0 ,ḡ 1 ) that is outside the outage setB, we can conclude thatd min (ḡ 0 ,ḡ 1 ) ≥ δP With the connection betweenH out andB, one can follow the steps in (122)-(124) to bound the Lebesgue measure ofH out as:
Let us now go back to the expression of y 1 in (135), i.e.,
Note that the minimum distance forx s isd min defined in (136). Lemma 8 shows that this minimum distance forx s is bounded byd min ≥ δP when the channels are not in the outage set, i.e., {h k } / ∈H out . This implies that we can estimatex s from y 1 with vanishing error probability as P → ∞. Sinceḡ 0 and g 1 are rationally independent, we can recover the symbolsq 0 andq 1 fromx s = (ḡ 0q0 + √ P α−1ḡ 1q1 ) after decodingx s . Then, the error probability for decoding v 1,c can be concluded as Pr[v 1,c =v 1,c ] → 0 as P → ∞
which is true for all the channel coefficients {h k } ∈ (1, 2] 2×3 \ H out , with Lebesgue measure L(H out ) satisfying L(H out ) → 0, as P → ∞.
Similarly, the result in (143) can also be extended to the case of k = 2 due to the symmetry.
